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1 Introduction
This paper is about asymmetry rather than symmetry. More specifically, its sub-
ject is the sort of spatial asymmetry exemplified by human hands. Hands lack any
plane of mirror symmetry. As a result they come in two varieties: left hands and
right hands. Similarly we talk of left-handed and right-handed screws, left-handed
and right-handed molecules, left-handed and right-handed coordinate systems, or
sets of axes, and so on.1 Objects of opposite handedness that are otherwise quali-
tatively identical are “mirror images” of each other. Kant was the first philosopher
to see something interesting in such objects. He called them incongruent counterparts.
They clearly differ in some way. For example, a glove which might be a perfect fit
for a right hand will not fit on its left-handed incongruent counterpart.
A fundamental question with which I shall be concerned is: in virtue of what does
one such object differ from its incongruent counterpart; what is the ground of the difference between
them? Kant first tackled this question in the context of a philosophical dispute, still
very much alive today, that goes by the name of the substantivalist–relationalist
debate (Kant, 1992 [1768]).2
∗To appear in Katherine Brading and Elena Castellani (eds), in preparation, Symmetries in Physics:
Philosophical Reflections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
1Note that it is not required that the objects lack every sort of spatial symmetry. Screws, for
example, can have (discrete) rotational symmetry if their threads are of the correct pitch.
2The debate concerns the ontological status of space. Its original protagonists were, on one
side, Newton and Samuel Clarke and, on the other side, Leibniz. Substantivalists follow Newton
in seeing space (or, in the context of relativistic physics, spacetime) as some kind of substance. It is
as real, and as fundamental, as the material objects and events that exist in it. Relationalists follow
Leibniz in denying that space is a fundamental entity. They do not deny that material objects are
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I will side with most—although admittedly not all—philosophers in defending
an account of incongruent counterparts according to which they are intrinsically
identical.3 Moreover, I will defend a relational account of handedness according to
which the difference between incongruent counterparts is grounded in their rela-
tions to each other and to other material objects. Kant thought that there were
reasons to reject such an account. Initially he concluded that the difference be-
tween left and right hands did indeed come down to a difference in their relational
attributes, but that these involved relations to “universal space as a unity” (Kant,
1992 [1768]: 365). Not long after reaching this conclusion, he also rejected this
substantivalist account of handedness. Instead he now believed that the difference
between incongruent counterparts was fundamentally incomprehensible: that it
could only be grasped in perception, through a “pure intuition,” and not by any
“characteristic marks intelligible to the mind through speech” (Kant, 1992 [1770]:
396).
Accounts of handedness according to which incongruent counterparts are in-
trinsically identical have recently faced criticism from a new quarter. In World
Enough and Space-Time, John Earman argues that the fact that our world displays
a lawlike left–right asymmetry poses a serious challenge to what I am calling rela-
tional accounts of handedness.
This paper is primarily concerned with the implications of Earman’s argu-
ment. However, it is useful to consider issues raised by Kant’s argument first, for
these help isolate the real interpretative difficulties posed by parity violation.
2 Incongruent Counterparts
Imagine that you are given a model of a left hand and a perfect mirror-image
(i.e. right-handed) duplicate of it. The distance between the tip of the thumb and
the index finger will be the same for both hands. Similarly, the angles that the
thumbs make to the planes of the palms will be identical in both cases. The two
hands are perfectly identical in terms of the distances between their corresponding
parts. Kant’s way of making this point was to note that a complete description of
one hand in terms of the positions of the parts relatively to one another will also
be true of its mirror-image (1992 [1768]: 370). For this reason he called them
counterparts.
Yet despite this similarity, the two hands are nevertheless incongruent: they
spatially extended. Nor do they deny that material objects stand in determinate distance relations
from one another. But they hold that such facts are basic. They deny that space exists apart from
such facts; that space has a reality of its own, independent of material objects and their spatial
properties.
3Harper (1991) and Walker (1978) are two exceptions.
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cannot be made to coincide—they cannot be superposed—by any rigid motion.
Kant’s own description of the incongruence runs: “the limits of the one cannot
also be the limits of the other” (1992 [1768]: 369). A little later he makes the same
point by noting that the surface which encloses the physical space of one hand
“cannot serve as a boundary to limit the other, no matter how that surface be
twisted and turned” (1992 [1768]: 371). It is worth stressing that the relevant no-
tion of possibility here is not that of physical possibility. It is physically impossible
to superpose a left hand and its perfect left-handed duplicate if they are both solid
material objects. Rather we must abstract from such physical limitations and con-
sider whether it is mathematically possible for the distances between the two objects
to be changed continuously in such a way that the two objects eventually coincide.
By restricting ourselves to rigid motion, we are only considering changes of the
total set of distances that preserve the internal distances between the parts of the
two objects.
It is time to state a question that will concern us for much of this section: how
is it possible that two objects which are counterparts can nevertheless be incongruent? Answers
to this question fall into two categories, within which there are further divisions.
One’s answer might involve the claim that left- and right-handed varieties of an
object differ intrinsically, and then go on to exploit these differences in explaining
their incongruence. Within this category one might view these intrinsic differences
as primitive and unanalyzable (Kant’s later transcendental idealist position is per-
haps of this type), or one might view the intrinsic differences as resulting, for exam-
ple, from a difference in the way the parts of the objects are related to each other.4
Alternatively one’s answer might involve the claim that incongruent counterparts
do not differ intrinsically in any way, and then seek to explain their incongruence
in terms of something that is external to each object taken by itself. Kant’s earlier
substantivalist position is of this type: the difference is to be explained in terms of
the objects’ different relations to substantival space. But so too is the most eco-
nomical, purely relational account according to which incongruence is explicable
using only the resources of relative distances.
Kant’s transcendental idealism aside, the view that left-handed and right-handed
objects differ intrinsically has not been popular. There are at least three strong ob-
jections to such a view, one of a general nature and two that are specific. The
general objection is that it is entirely unclear that we have any conceptual grasp
of what such intrinsic differences involve.5 In particular, no one has provided an
illuminating account of how such intrinsic differences connect with incongruence,
4Van Cleve calls this latter position “internalism” (Van Cleve, 1991: 22). Clearly such relations
must include more than just the relative distances and relations that are reducible to them.
5This objection does not tell against Kant’s later position, for he was at pains to deny that
we have a conceptual understanding of the left–right distinction; it is supposedly only grasped in
experience.
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or with relevant practical abilities; for example, that I can tell without difficulty of
a left hand that it is left-handed and distinguish it from a right hand.
The two specific objections are variations on a theme.6 The first exploits the
fact that two hands will never be incongruent if embedded in a non-orientable
space.7 So can hands in such spaces instantiate different intrinsic properties (prim-
itive or otherwise), or not? If they can, one will be able to move a ‘left-handed’
object into the space occupied by a ‘right-handed’ one. Does a hand originally
exemplifying the property of being ‘left-handed’ come to lose this basic property
and acquire that of being ‘right-handed’ merely as a result of such a motion? Al-
though they are said to differ in some primitive property, this property appears
redundant, making no contact with any other spatial facts about the hands. But
if hands in such spaces cannot instantiate the primitive properties of being left- or
right-handed, then how is one meant to understand the dependence of whether
or not an object can instantiate such a property on the type of space in which it is
embedded?
The other objection runs along the same lines, but this time exploits the fact
that the incongruence of two hands in part depends on the dimensionality of the
space in which they are embedded. One could move a left hand into the space
occupied by a right hand if there was an extra spatial dimension through which
it could be moved,8 just as the letter “F” can be brought into coincidence with its
mirror image on the page, F, if one is allowed to lift it off the page. Does whether
or not hands have primitive left-handed or right-handed properties depend on the
dimensionality of space?
These considerations give us more that enough reason to see whether incon-
gruence can be explained without recourse to the postulation of intrinsic differ-
ences. I start by considering the purely relational account. Can we get by merely
with relative distances?
The incongruence of left and right hands shows that they differ in some re-
spect. It is surely reasonable to call this difference a purely spatial difference. That
left and right hands match in terms of the distances between their parts shows that
this difference not grounded in these distances. However, the relationalist is not
committed to view that every spatial difference between two objects supervenes
on a difference in the spatial arrangement of their parts. He can also appeal to
6The following type of considerations are emphasized by Nerlich (1994: 51–3), but see also
Frederick (1991: 8) and Van Cleve (1991: 22–3).
7Or, to adopt relationalist language, if the spatial relations between them are such that the
lowest-dimensional spaces in which they are embeddable are all non-orientable. Some believe that
failure to provide an account of the orientability of space might show that relationalism is ultimately
untenable. I disagree, for reasons elaborated on below, pp. 6ff.
8Although string theorists would have us believe there are in fact six or more such dimensions,
they are ‘too small’ to permit the required motion.
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the distance relations that hold between the two objects, and between them and
other objects. Once this is acknowledged, there would seem to be no reason why
the relationalist cannot view the incongruence of two counterparts as grounded in
such external relations.
Now nothing in my original definition of incongruence precluded relational-
ism.9 In fact, one might even think that incongruence has been defined in purely
relational terms: rigid motion is defined in terms of the constancy of the distances
between the parts of an object and coincidence (the occupancy of the same bound-
aries) is defined in terms of the distances between (the corresponding parts of) the
two objects. Even when we seek the ground of such incongruence, it seems that the
relationalist has no reason to be embarrassed. It is simply a mathematical fact,
and a comprehensible one, that, when constrained to obey the algebraic relationships
of Euclidean geometry, some numbers (the possible distances between two con-
gruent counterparts) can be continuously altered so as to vanish while others (the
distances between two incongruent counterparts) cannot.
The claim that the relationalist can not only accommodate but can explain
incongruence is significant. As already noted, Kant came to the view that the
incongruence of counterparts was, in a certain sense, fundamentally incompre-
hensible. He thought that it could be grasped only in experience. In his Inaugural
Dissertation he writes:
between solid bodies which are perfectly similar and equal but in-
congruent, such as left and right hands (in so far as they are con-
ceived only according to their extension), or spherical triangles from
two opposite hemispheres, there is a difference, in virtue of which it
is impossible that the limits of their extension should coincide – and
that, in spite of the fact that, in respect of everything which may be
expressed by means of characteristic marks intelligible to the mind
through speech, they could be substituted for one another. It is, there-
fore, clear that in these cases the difference, namely the incongruity,
can only be apprehended by a certain pure intuition. (Kant, 1992
[1770]: 396)
But this is simply a non sequitur. Suppose that incongruent counterparts are intrin-
sically identical; that they do not differ in themselves in any way. So a fortiori we
cannot, restricting ourselves to just the internal distances between the parts of two
hands, understand or explain the hands’ incongruence. Nevertheless we can both
understand and explain their incongruence in terms of the different ways any two
hands can be related to each other. It just does not follow from the fact that we
9The definition deliberately does not follow others that can be found in the literature; see e.g.
Earman (1989: Chap. 7), Brighouse (1999) and Huggett (2000).
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cannot intellectually grasp an intrinsic difference between left and right hands that
we can have no intellectual grasp of the basis of their incongruence, or that this
incongruence is manifest only in experience.
Those whose intuitions lead them still to side with Kant at this point need to
respond to the following challenge: Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the
relationalist is correct in asserting that all spatial facts are reducible to facts about
relative distances between material objects. The relationalist will insist that any
two coexisting hands stand in some quite determinate distance relations from one
another. How can it be denied that the possibility of incongruent counterparts is
already secured?10 When things are put this way, surely the burden of proof is now
on someone who wishes to assert that the incongruence or otherwise of the two
hands is not determined despite the various facts about the distances between the
them.
So far we have seen that relative distances alone are sufficient to ground the
incongruence of two handed objects that are otherwise identical. However, there
are two other questions about handedness that have exercised philosophers. The
first is: in virtue of what is an object handed? The second is: what accounts for
the particular handedness of a handed object—what makes it, say, a left hand?
My initial characterization of a handed object suggested that its key feature was
that it lacked any plane of mirror symmetry. This is, again, a feature highlighted
by Kant, who noted that a handed object cannot consist of “two halves which
are symmetrically arranged relatively to a single intersecting plane” (Kant, 1992
[1768]: 370). One might think that this is a characteristic that is reducible to facts
concerning the relative distances between the parts of the object.11 However, as
Nerlich notes, more is needed.
He defines an enantiomorph as follows:
each reflective mapping of [an enantiomorph] differs in its outcome
from every rigid motion of it. (Nerlich, 1994: 51)
Otherwise the object is a homomorph. Nerlich’s principal contention is that “whether
a hand. . . is enantiomorphic or homomorphic depends on the nature of the space
it is in. In particular it depends on the dimensionality or the orientability, but in
any case on some aspect of the overall connectedness or topology of the space”
(1994: 53). Nerlich’s claim, then, is that an object’s being handed is not reducible
10I have been tacitly assuming that the relative distances involved are those of an infinite N -
dimensional Euclidean space. Things are obviously more complicated when one considers more
general sets of relative distances. For some discussion, see Pooley (2002: Chap. 6).
11Carol Brighouse, however, worries that talk of a plane of symmetry and of lines intersecting it
at right-angles is not obviously relationally acceptable (Brighouse, 1999: 56–8). The relationalist
strategy that I outline below sidesteps Brighouse’s worries.
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to facts about the relative distances between material objects. It also depends on
the dimensionality and orientability of the space in which the object is embedded.
Even if one were to agree with Nerlich about this, it is not clear that this ob-
servation can be used as an argument against a relational account of space, and
for two reasons. The first is that we should ask why the relationalist about space
is under any obligation to offer an equivalent, relationally pure definition of enan-
tiomorphy. He believes that spatial facts are exhausted by the catalogue of relative
distances between material points (and the fact that these must obey certain con-
straints). We have seen that this is enough to allow for the possibility of incongruent
counterparts. If it turns out that substantivalism underwrites properties, such as
enantiomorphy, which are not well-defined by the lights of the relationalist’s on-
tology, then so much the worse for enantiomorphy. Nothing in our experience of
objects such as hands forces us to admit the existence of such additional properties,
just as (so the relationalist would like to maintain) nothing in our theorizing about
motion forces us to admit the reality of space.
Secondly, it has yet to be shown that the relationalist cannot provide a defini-
tion of enantiomorphy. Nerlich’s observations might suggest that the relationalist
needs to come up with a surrogate definition of orientability, and this is indeed the
strategy that most have pursued (Brighouse, 1999; Huggett, 2000). Unfortunately
for the relationalist, it has not been entirely successful. For example, although an
object’s being multiply related is a necessary condition of its being embeddable
in a non-orientable space (for all non-orientable spaces are multiply connected),
it is not a sufficient condition. Kant’s own example of triangles on a sphere is
precisely an example of multiply related yet enantiomorphic figures. Huggett sug-
gests that what is needed is a “general representation theorem of the form ‘space
S is orientable iff relations of type are instantiated’ ” (Huggett, 2000: 225). No
such theorem has been forthcoming. The relationalist also needs an account of
the dimensionality of space.
I wish to propose that the relationalist has a way of sidestepping some of these
difficulties. First, in order to be able to exploit (rather than explain) the fact12 that
the exact nature of an object’s multiple relatedness (if it is multiply related) can
determine whether or not the spaces in which it is embeddable are orientable or
not, the relationalist does not need to have the type of representation theorem
to which Huggett alludes. Second, as Huggett notes, the relationalist can talk
freely of embedding the particular relative distances between the parts of some
material object in a space, so long as the operation is understood to be a purely
12If it is a fact. This is something that the relationalist will want to prove. However, the mere
possibility that it is a fact is enough, at this stage of the dialectic, to save the relationalist. The onus
is now on the substantivalist to prove that the exact nature of an object’s multiple relatedness does
not fix the orientability of the lowest-dimensional embedding spaces. Thanks to Jeremy Butterfield
and Carl Hoefer for saving me from overstating the relationalist’s case.
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mathematical exercise (Huggett, 2000: 224).
So now suppose, additionally, that the relationalist has an account of the di-
mensionality of space.13 He can then define the enantiomorphy of a material
object by adopting Nerlich’s definition, but now with respect to all abstract em-
bedding spaces of the specified dimension. For example, if it is the case that ac-
cording to an empirically adequate relational theory space has three dimensions,
the relationalist can claim that an object is an enantiomorph iff, with respect to
every possible abstract 3-dimensional embedding space, each reflective mapping
of the object differs in its outcome from every rigid motion of it. On this definition,
planar objects count as homomorphs as do 3-dimensional hands that are multiply
related so as to be embeddable only within non-orientable 3-dimensional spaces.
Hands that are embeddable only within orientable 3-dimensional spaces count as
enantiomorphs, even though they are, of course, embeddable in spaces of higher
dimensions.
One suspects that Nerlich himself would be prepared to grant much, if not all
of this (see, e.g., Nerlich, 1994: 61–2). He would still see the phenomena of hand-
edness and enantiomorphy as supporting substantivalism for two reasons. One,
which takes us beyond our topic, is that he already sees the relationalist’s employ-
ment of brute, unmediated, spatial relations as suspect (see, especially, Nerlich,
1994: 23–33). The second is that he believes that the substantivalist account of
enantiomorphy is simply more illuminating. The relationalist account, to the ex-
tent that it explains anything at all, does so on the back of the substantivalist one:
. . . the orientability of space does determine the handedness of hands,
for it determines which paths there are in a space which a hand might
take. It is a genuinely explanatory idea. Spatial relations, I suggest,
explain enantiomorphy only by way of entailing the orientability of
the containing space, and it is through that understanding that we
come to grasp handedness. (Nerlich, 1994: 67)
This, however, is disputable on two grounds. First the relationalist account of
incongruence (if not of Nerlich’s definition of enantiomorphy) does not appeal to
facts about embedding spaces. All it deals in are facts about relative distances and
about what changes of relative distances are possible, and “possible” here need not
be thought of as constrained by an embedding space.
Second, the facts that the substantivalist appeals to are really of exactly the
same type. Ultimately the spatial relations between the parts of space are either
13This might be fixed by the adoption of some specific relational dynamical theory. Relational
theories typically simply assert, via the choice of some relative configuration space for example,
that the relative distances between material objects are constrained to be embeddable in, say, a
Euclidean space of no more than three dimensions; see, for example, Barbour and Bertotti (1982).
Note that this is also likely to fix the orientability of space directly.
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simply assumed to be, or are stipulated to be, constrained in certain ways. That
the substantivalist believes that relations between material points, and the possible
motions of those points, are mediated and constrained in virtue of those points
being located at various spatial points is, quite simply, a distraction. How is Nerlich
to explain the incongruence of two hand-shaped regions of space? Space and its
shape might be easier to picture than algebraic facts about distances, but the idea
that it is more explanatory is illusory. For even in this case, the facts that ultimately
explain are precisely algebraic facts about distances.
I now return to the second question raised on page 6: what accounts for
the particular handedness of a handed object? To see that, once again, noth-
ing more than relative distances is required, it will prove useful to consider the
anti-relationalist argument of Kant’s 1768 paper.
In this paper, Kant explicitly characterizes his aim as that of providing a “clear
proof that: Absolute space, independently of the existence of all matter. . . has a reality of its own”
(1992 [1768]: 366). In other words he sets out to vindicate Newton’s substantivalist
conception of space over Leibniz’s relationalist conception.14 His argument does
not challenge the claim that the relationalist can account for the incongruence of left
and right hands. Rather it suggests that the difference between left and right goes
beyond the relational facts so far cited.
After rehearsing the various definitional facts about incongruent counterparts
and after noting that their incongruence cannot be grounded in a difference in
how their parts are related, Kant makes the following claim:
. . . imagine that the first created thing was a human hand. That hu-
man hand would have to be either a right hand or a left hand. The
action of the creative cause in producing the one would have of neces-
sity to be different from the action of the creative cause producing the
counterpart.
Kant rightly notes that this is incompatible with relationalism:
14Sometime prior to 1768, Kant is generally acknowledged to have held a Leibnizian, relational
view of space. This, however, is a matter of some controversy amongst Kant scholars. Some argue
that he is better seen as advocating some kind of compatibilism. Things are further complicated
by the fact that, as already discussed, just two years after apparently arguing for a Newtonian
view of space, Kant published his first “critical” work, the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, is which
he rejects both substantivalism and relationalism, arguing instead that space is in some sense ‘in
us’, a form of our intuition. The seeds of Kant’s transcendental idealism about space are already
discernible in the 1768 essay. However, the extent to which incongruent counterparts by themselves
led Kant to transcendental idealism is again a matter of some controversy.
What should be stressed for the purposes of the present discussion is that it is evident that by
1768 Kant believed that his argument from incongruent counterparts provided a decisive reason
to reject a purely relational account of handedness. Nowhere in his subsequent writings does Kant
retreat from this claim.
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. . . there is no difference in the relation of the parts of the hand to each
other, and that is so whether it be a right hand or a left hand; it would
therefore follow that the hand would be completely indeterminate in
respect of such a property. In other words, the hand would fit equally
well on either side of the human body; but that is impossible. (1992
[1768]: 371).
How should the relationalist respond to this particular challenge? He can
simply deny Kant’s initial premise, that every hand in an otherwise empty universe
is necessarily either a right or a left hand. Certainly Kant is wrong to suppose that
the lone hand’s being of indeterminate handedness entails the absurdity that it
can fit on both sides of a human body. For suppose that one is given a relational
description of a hand and also a relational description of a handless human body
that has various internal asymmetries involving the heart and other organs. One
might then ask on which side of this body does the hand (properly) fit: the side on
which the heart is, or on the other side?
The relationalist certainly should not answer “both”. Rather he will deny that
the question makes sense independently of a specification of the relative distances
between the body and the hand. There are two incompatible ways in which a
body satisfying the relational description and the lone hand could coexist in a
single universe. According to one such way, the hand will fit on the side of the
body that the heart is on. According to the other way, the situation is reversed; the
hand fits on the other side of the body to that on which the heart is. But either
way, the hand will fit determinately on one, and only one, side of the body. And
which side it fits is determined by the distances between the hand and the various
parts of the body, i.e. by purely relational facts.
Although the relationalist’s contention that the difference between left and
right hand supervenes on the distances between them and between other mate-
rial objects does not entail a patent absurdity, one might still wonder whether it
is not in tension with our evident ability to recognize, for example, left hands as
left. However, a little reflection suggests that the account the relationalist must give
of our practical abilities and linguistic practices—of how we teach the meanings
of “left” and “right” and of the fact that we are often prone to confuse left and
right—is far more plausible than any account which postulates our recognizing
an intrinsic difference between incongruent counterparts or recognizing that the
hand bears some relation to (invisible) space. In fact, so far as I know, no one has
attempted to give a genuine account of our abilities that postulates our recognizing
either of these things.
The basic elements of a relational account have been outlined many times.15
We have seen that, despite holding that left and right hands are intrinsically iden-
15See, for example, Earman (1989: Ch. 7, §2), Gardner (1990: Ch. 17), Huggett (1999: 209–12),
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tical, the relationalist will also acknowledge that they fall into two equivalence
classes defined, roughly speaking, by the relation of congruence. But it is then
straightforward to understand how a practice of distinguishing members of these
classes might involve all the hands of one class being given one ‘name’ (“left”),
and all hands of the other being given another (“right”). Causal links between
the speakers who are party to this practice, and between the speakers and actual
hands, will ensure that the practice remains consistent. Together with an ability
to recognize a hand as congruent or incongruent to hands with which one has
previously been presented and has been told are left or right, these causal links are
all that are required.
According to the relationalist account, therefore, the only facts about a left
hand that make it left, is the fact that we call it “left”, that it is congruent to every
other hand that we in fact call “left” and incongruent to every hand that we call
“right”.16 Such an account of the meanings of “left” and “right” is, of course,
very close to a causal theory of reference for proper names. And in certain re-
spects the terms “left” and “right” are very much like names. What was it about
Immanuel Kant, for example, that made it correct for his contemporaries to call
him “Immanuel Kant”? Nothing, other than the fact that he was actually known
as “Immanuel Kant”, that there was a practice of calling him “Immanuel Kant”
and so on.
Can this really be all there is to the left–right distinction? I believe that it is.
Such a point of view receives indirect support from what Jonathan Bennett calls
the Kantian Hypothesis (Bennett, 1970).17 This is the claim that chiral terms such
as “left” and “right” cannot ultimately be explained without ostensively demon-
strating, for example, a left hand. Various chiral terms can be explained in terms
of each other. For example, one can define “left” in terms of “clockwise” and
other, related, notions. But to break out of a rather tight circle, one must ultimately
show what one means by “clockwise” or by “left.” Non-chiral words will never be
enough.
This thesis can be put in the form of a predicament that Martin Gardner
calls the Ozma problem (Gardner, 1990: Chap. 18). Suppose that we are in radio
contact with some extra-galactic civilization. Gardner’s Ozma problem is: “Is
there any way to communicate the meaning of “left” by a language transmitted in
Hoefer (2000: §3) and Saunders (2000: §3.3). These accounts, of course, differ from each other,
and from my own, in minor ways.
16The question “in virtue of what is a left hand left” is thus rather misleading. I should perhaps
stress that my favoured relational account of handedness is not part of a general nominalism ac-
cording to which the instances of any general term “X” have in common only the fact that we call
them all “X”. It is only the left–right contrast, not handedness per se, that is purely nominal.
17The reason for attributing this hypothesis to Kant is Kant’s insistence, noted earlier, that the
difference between left and right cannot be made intelligible through concepts.
11
the form of pulsating signals? By the terms of the problem we may say anything
we please to our listeners, ask them to perform any experiment whatever, with
one proviso: There is to be no asymmetric object or structure that we and they can observe
in common” (1990: 167). If Bennett’s ‘Kantian hypothesis’ is correct, we cannot
manage the task without some asymmetric observable object in common with our
alien friends. Appealing to the side of the body on which the heart is won’t help,
for example, because the alien hearts, if they have hearts, might be on the right.18
If the mechanism in virtue of which the terms “left” and “right” refer is indeed
what I have suggested it is, the difficulty of explaining their meanings within the
constraints of the Ozma problem are readily understandable.
Although Kant concludes in favour of substantivalism in his 1768 essay, he ap-
pears to do so very much by default. There is no explanation in his essay of how
substantival space is able to ground that which relationalism supposedly cannot:
the incongruence of counterparts. If substantivalism and relationalism represent
two genuinely exhaustive alternatives, then an argument against one would be an
argument for the other. But as I noted earlier, Kant quickly came to the view that
they are not jointly exhaustive, and instead opted for the tertium quid of transcen-
dental idealism.
However, Hoefer (2000) has recently pointed out that there is one way in which
the postulation of substantival space can be used to secure Kant’s intuition that a
hand in an otherwise empty universe is necessarily either a left or a right hand.
One is to imagine that the universe contains a single hand and that the space in
which the hand exists is the substantival space of our actual world. One would then
appear to be able to appeal to facts of the following sort: in the imagined possible
world, the lone hand is either determinately congruent to the hand-shaped region
of space that is actually and currently occupied by my left hand, or it is determi-
nately congruent to the hand-shaped region of space that is actually and currently
occupied by my right hand. In the first case the lone hand is left-handed, in the
second it is right-handed (cf. Hoefer, 2000: 241). I wish to make five observations
about this substantivalist account of a lone hand’s determine handedness.
First, as Hoefer is keen to stress, such an account is only open to the substan-
tivalist who believes that there are primitive facts about which points of space or
spacetime in two different possible worlds count as the “same” point. In terms
18Actually, as will become apparent, we have known since the 1950s that we could exploit the
fact that the laws of nature violate parity. One might worry that, since we are communicating
through photons, we cannot rule out the possibility that our alien correspondents live in an anti-
matter galaxy. Were the laws CP invariant, their following our instructions and carrying out an
experiment illustrating parity violation would lead them to conclude that “left” meant right. For-
tunately we can appeal to CP violating experiments to overcome this potential problem. Moreover
TCP invariance is not a problem because our communicating at all presupposes that we agree
about “before” and “after”!
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that will be more familiar to philosophers, it is not enough that one be a substan-
tivalist; to give such an account, one must also be a haecceitist. Since the issue was
brought into focus by Earman and Norton’s version of Einstein’s “hole argument”,
many philosophers have concluded that commitment to such primitive identities,
and the corresponding haecceitistic differences between possible worlds, is not an
obvious concomitant of a belief in the fundamental reality of space or spacetime
(see, especially, Brighouse, 1994; Rynasiewicz, 1994; Hoefer, 1996).19
Second, the account only works for possible worlds the space(time)s of which
have the same global topology as that of the actual world. This is because it is
not clear what transworld identity relations, primitive or otherwise, could hold
between two non-diffeomorphic spaces.
In fact, that the two spaces have the same global topology is not even sufficient.
Let us assume substantivalism and primitive transworld identity for the sake of ar-
gument. There will nevertheless be spacetime points that are the location of some
instantaneous stage of my left hand in this world but that form a perfect sphere in
some other possible world. All that is required is that the region they constitute
is topologically identical to my left hand. The handedness of the hands of this
possible world will thus be undetermined for they will all be equally (in)congruent
to the space actually occupied by my left hand.20
Third, although these complications do not tell against Hoefer’s reconstruc-
tion being faithful to Kant’s thinking—Kant and his contemporaries implicitly
assumed that the spaces of all possible worlds were isometric to E3—the recon-
struction certainly does not do justice to Kant’s assertion that having a particular
handedness is a matter of having the correct relation to space as a unity. Accord-
ing to Hoefer’s Kant, it consists in having the right relation to particular regions of
space, for example, the region which is actually the location of my left hand. This
is something that Kant denies (Kant, 1992 [1768]: 365).21
Fourth, it is evident that the account is surprisingly close to the relationalist
account of handedness just given. In particular, note how the account ‘explains’
what it is to be a left-handed hand-shaped region of space. This is held to be
merely a matter of congruence to the actual material hands that we in fact, actually,
19I should also mention that not all philosophers agree. Belot and Earman, for example, argue
against substantivalists who reject haecceitism, whom they brand “sophisticated substantivalists”
(Belot and Earman, 2000, 2001). For a response to their arguments, see Pooley (2002: Chap. 9).
20the restriction to points underlying an instantaneous stage of my left hand is incidental. There are
possible worlds in which the spacetime points forming the worldtubes of every actual hand form
worldtubes of perfect spheres, or of objects whose handedness changes over time etc.
21Hoefer does point out that “no particular points, lines, rays or regions [of space] are the ones
that have to be mentioned” (2000: 243). However, this hardly makes it the case that being of a
particular handedness is a matter of a hand’s relation to space as a unity, rather than, say, to space
as a plurality. Kant is explicit in his denial that handedness involves a hand’s relation to places (and
hence, presumably, to sets of these).
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call “left”. If one believes in primitive identity, one can exploit the fact that a
particular hand-shaped region of space exists in a large class of possible worlds
to secure the handedness of material hands in all these world. One is effectively
securing a vicarious congruence between material hands in two different possible
worlds by way of particular hand-shaped regions of space that are supposed to exist
in both. If this is all there is to the substantivalist’s explanation of the handedness
of the hands in one-hand worlds, then the relationalist’s assertion that such hands
do not have a determinate handedness starts to look decidedly less exceptionable.
The final, and related, observation is that the account surely does not connect
with our epistemological situation. We certainly do not recognize hands as left in
virtue of recognizing their congruence to particular regions of space. Such regions
are invisible. This underlines the fact that the account is effectively a marriage of
a relational account of handedness with substantivalism and haecceitism, so as to
secure the determinate handedness of hands in other possible worlds.
3 The challenge of parity violation
The conclusion of the first part of this paper is that objects of opposite handedness
that are otherwise identical, such as idealized left and right hands, do not differ in-
trinsically in any way and, furthermore, that their opposite handedness is a matter
of their external spatial relations to each other (and to a language using commu-
nity that has assigned quite arbitrary labels to the two incongruent classes of such
objects). Recently, philosophers have realized that modern physics appears to sug-
gest that there is a substantial difficulty with this view. The problem goes beyond
the mere existence of incongruent counterparts; it arises from parity violation, the
fact that the laws of nature appear to distinguish between left and right.
The transformation of parity inversion is spatial reflection through the origin. In
the context of quantum field theory, it is closely connected to two other discrete
transformations, namely time reversal (temporal reflection through the origin) and
charge conjugation (the interchange of matter and anti-matter). If space has an odd
number of dimensions (as the space of our world has) parity inversion maps a
handed object onto an incongruent counterpart.22 If the parity transformation
is a symmetry of a theory, it will always map physically possible states of affairs
onto physically possible states of affairs. Hence if a particular handed object or
process is physically possible, then parity conservation implies that its incongruent
22Consider the Cartesian coordinates of a left hand relative to an arbitrary (left- or right-handed)
set of axes. Now consider a passive parity inversion: a point that originally had coordinates (x, y, z)
is assigned new coordinates (−x,−y,−z). The coordinates of the left hand with respect to the new
coordinate system are the coordinates of a possible right hand with respect to the original coordinate
system.
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counterpart will also be physically possible. Conversely, if parity inversion fails to
be a symmetry, then there will be at least some cases where it maps a physically
possible state of affairs onto one that the law prohibits. If we assume that spatial
translations and rotations are symmetries of the theory, then these will be cases
where there is a type of enantiomorphic object or process of one handedness that
is physically possible and yet its incongruent counterpart is not.23
John Earman (1989: Chap. 7) was the first to suggest that, while the relational
account outlined above may be able to deal with incongruent counterparts, the
fact that a law of nature violates parity poses a more recalcitrant problem. In fact,
he sees parity violation as having implications for substantivalist–relationalist de-
bate in much the way Kant initially thought that incongruent counterparts had.
The reason is that he believes the substantivalist can ground the left–right asym-
metry exhibited in processes governed by parity-violating laws whereas the rela-
tionalist cannot. I shall shortly question this assumption.
Earman’s example of a process that exemplifies such a law involves the decay
of neutral hyperons that was experimentally investigated by Crawford et al. (1957)
as a test for parity violation. An example that may be more familiar is the β-decay
of radioactive cobalt atoms, the subject of the first experimental confirmation of
parity violation (Wu et al., 1957). In such a decay the electron and its antineutrino
are preferentially emitted along the axis of nuclear spin. Given this, there are two,
mirror-image possibilities, depicted in Figure 1. In (a) the electron is emitted in
the same direction as the spin of the cobalt nucleus, in (b) the electron is emitted


















Figure 1: Co60 → Ni60 + e− + ν¯e
The weak interaction, which governs this decay process, fails to be symmetric
23Actually, this is what is required of a deterministic parity-violating law. If the law is essentially
probabilistic, then parity will also fail to be a symmetry if different probabilities are assigned to a
pair of counterpart yet incongruent processes.
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under parity inversion. The decay (a), it turns out, is much more probable than
(b). In Wu’s experiment, a sample of cobalt 60 was cooled to near absolute zero
and then subjected to a magnetic field to align the nuclear spins: many more elec-
trons were detected emerging in the direction of nuclear spin than in the opposite
direction.
In terms of this example, here is how Earman puts the challenge to the rela-
tional account of handedness defended above:
The failure of mirror image reflection to be a symmetry of laws of
nature is an embarrassment for the relationist account sketched. . . for
as it stands that account does not have the analytical resources for
expressing the law-like asymmetry for the analogue of Kant’s hand
standing alone. Putting some 20th century words into Kant’s mouth,
let it be imagined that the first created process is a [Co60 → Ni60 +
e−+ ν¯e] decay. The absolutist has no problem in writing laws in which
[(a)] is more probable than [(b)], but the relationist. . . certainly does
since for him [(a)] and [(b)] are supposed to be merely different modes
of presentation of the same relational model. Evidently, to accommo-
date the new physics, relational models must be more variegated than
initially thought. (1989: 148)
Without doubt, Earman has put his finger on something. But one might won-
der whether that the full scale of the problem has been stated. Two things are
worth saying immediately. First, given the conclusion of the first part of this paper,
is it obvious that the absolutist (a.k.a. the substantivalist) has no problem “writing
laws in which (a) is more probable than (b)”?
Modulo the qualifications made above, Hoefer’s haecceitist substantivalist can
secure the handedness of lone hands in otherwise empty possible worlds. In par-
ticular, Hoefer’s substantivalist can claim that the reality of space grounds the gen-
uine distinctness of a world in which the first created process perfectly resembles
(a) and a world in which it perfectly resembles (b). However, he does so by claim-
ing that processes of type (a) stand in different relations to particular bits of space
to those in which processes of type (b) stand. It seems doubtful that such a sub-
stantivalist will want to write relations to particular bits of space into the laws. As
Hoefer says: “It seems wrong for a law of nature to contain reference to a partic-
ular, contingent physical object. But it seems (to me) at least as wrong for a law of
nature to contain reference to particular bits of space. . . ” (Hoefer, 2000: 253).
Second, Earman’s way of setting up the challenge, in terms of the “first created
process”, suggests a relationalist response that echoes Herman Weyl’s response to
Kant’s argument. Weyl wrote, “Had God, rather than making first a left hand
and then a right hand, started with a right hand and then formed another right
hand, he would have changed the plan of the universe not in the first but in the second
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act, by bringing forth a hand which was equally rather than oppositely oriented
to the first created specimen” (Weyl, 1952: 21). Similarly, perhaps the relationalist
can maintain that whether the first created process is a typical decay governed by
the weak interaction, or whether it is a possible but atypical decay, will depend on
its incongruence or otherwise to the majority of subsequent similar decays. This,
I think, is ultimately what the relationalist has to say. One aim of the rest of this
paper is to highlight some of the costs involved.
TheWeyl-style relationalist is obviously allowed the relationally acceptable dis-
tinction between a world where the first decay process is typical (i.e., congruent to
the majority of subsequent decays) and one where it is atypical. He is also allowed
the distinction between (parity violating) worlds where the majority of decays are
handed in the same way and (parity symmetric) worlds in which decays of oppo-
site handedness occur with equal frequency. The fundamental problem faced by
any account of handedness according to which incongruent counterparts do not
differ intrinsically is, in those worlds where the majority of decays are handed in
the same way, how can this asymmetry be explained? If the decay modes (a) and (b)
are intrinsically identical, what could ground their different likelihoods?
The challenge posed by parity violation is thus well-put by Van Cleve, who
anticipates Hoefer’s unease with laws that make reference to particulars:
God could no doubt see to it that certain kinds of particles always
decay into configurations of the same handedness. But we need to be
able to suppose that the result in question comes about through law
rather than divine supervision. How can it be law that particles al-
ways. . . display decay modes of one orientation rather than another, if
orientation is not intrinsic? If one particle has decayed in left-handed
fashion, how does the next particle ‘know’ that it should do likewise?
It’s instruction cannot be to trace a pattern of a certain intrinsic de-
scription; it can only be to do what the first particle did.
The problem here is not ‘action at a distance’, though perhaps
that will trouble some. It is rather that the required laws would make
ineliminable reference to particular things, whereas it is generally sup-
posed to be of the essence of laws that they state relations of kind to
kind. (Van Cleve, 1991: 21–2)
In a moment I shall suggest that in one respect Van Cleve is wrong; the prob-
lem is action at a distance and not ineliminable reference to particular things. But
to see how reference to particular things—whether they be particle decays or re-
gions of space—can be avoided, we need to review some of the details of the law














Figure 2: chirality in the zero mass limit
4 A relational account of parity violation
That Nature treats left- and right-handed varieties of certain processes differently
is puzzling. And yet we have an extremely well-confirmed physical theory describ-
ing how it does so. How does the mathematics of the theory work? Does it do so
by revealing that left-handed and right-handed varieties of handed objects differ
intrinsically after all?
The most fundamental description of parity-violating interactions so far for-
mulated is that given by the Weinberg-Salam gauge field theory, part of the Stan-
dard Model.24 The Weinberg-Salam theory treats elementary particles, such as
electrons and quarks, as excitations of Dirac quantum fields interacting via gauge
boson fields (the photon, the W+ and W−, and the Z ). Parity violation results
from the fact that the theory treats the ‘left’ and ‘right’ chiral components of the
same Dirac field quite differently; they couple to the interaction fields in different
ways. In particular, ‘right-handed’ particle fields do not couple to the W bosons
at all.
So what does it mean to call a component of a field ‘left handed’? The Dirac
field can be thought of as the sum of two component fields, the left and right chiral
components, which, in the zero mass limit, correspond to particles of definite and
opposite helicity. The helicity of a particle is the projection of its spin in its direction
of motion. Helicity eigenstates of a spin-12 particle involve the spin being either
aligned or anti-aligned with the particle’s direction of motion. These constitute
two incongruent, ‘handed’ objects. By definition, left-handed massless particles are
particles of negative helicity (their spin is opposite to their direction of motion),
while right-handed particles are particles of positive helicity.
Helicity and chirality are not quite the same thing, however. A helicity eigen-
state of a massive particle will involve both left- and right-handed pieces. More-
over, while the chirality of a particle is Lorentz invariant, the helicity of a massive
particle is not. For example, one can Lorentz boost by a large enough velocity
in the direction of the particle’s motion so as to reverse that direction of motion
24I review some relevant details of the Weinberg-Salam theory in an appendix.
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while leaving the direction of spin unchanged. This cannot be done, of course, if
the particle is massless and thus travelling at the speed of light. The helicity of a
massless particle is an invariant property under the (restricted) Lorentz group.
A spinning object defines an axis: that about which it is spinning. For a given
axis there are then two possibilities involved: if one looks along the axis of spin
from a given direction, the object will either appear to be spinning clockwise or
anticlockwise. These two possibilities are represented by associating each with a
direction: the spin vector points along the axis of spin away from the point of view
from which the spinning appears clockwise. This is equivalent to the definition of
angular momentum vector l as l i = εijkxjpk where εijk is completely antisymmetric
in its three indices, ε123 = +1 and the components of x and p and given with
respect to a conventional, right-handed set of Cartesian axes.
In the last analysis, in each case, the convention for associating a direction
with a spinning object can only be specified via ostension. We can explain what
we mean by left-handed and right-handed particles in terms of their relations to
right-handed sets of axes, or in terms of their relations to typical clocks. But, if
Bennett’s Kantian hypothesis is correct, the meanings of these terms cannot be
conveyed without ostension.
Turning now to the case of negative and positive helicity particles, one sees
from the conventionality of the definition of the direction of spin, and from the
need for ostension in specifying this direction, that to explain the difference be-
tween negative and positive helicity one must also ultimately appeal to ostension.
The parallel with left and right hands is obvious. An intrinsic description true of a
negative helicity particle will also be true of a positive helicity particle. Yet we can
understand why there are two, incongruent, types in purely relational terms (i.e.,
in terms that do not presuppose an intrinsic difference). For two spin-12 particles of
definite helicity travelling in the same direction they can be spinning in the same
sense, or the opposite sense.
It turns out that the mathematics of parity violation does not involve treating
being left-handed and being right-handed as different substantive and intrinsic
properties. As is explained in the appendix, left and right components of the
fields are distinguished in terms of their differing congruence relations to the right-
handed coordinate systems with respect to which the theory is standardly written.
One then goes on simply to assert of these two components that they interact
differently.
This difference in the way they interact is not further explained in terms of
different intrinsic properties possessed by the particles. Although I note in the
appendix that the left and right components of the field are assigned different
values of “weak hypercharge” and “weak isospin”, these are not properties that
explain their particular couplings to the gauge fields. For two varieties of particle to
have the particular values of weak hypercharge that they have, for example, just is
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for them to couple to the gauge field Bµ with the relative strengths that they do. In
fact, it seems plausible that, quite generally, particle varieties are only individuated
in terms of their particular place in a network of differently interacting particles.
Moreover, it cannot be the helicity of a particle alone that determines which
type of interactions it can undergo. The reason is that the ‘left-handed’ Dirac
field component ψL(x)—and its adjoint, ψL(x)—are associated with left-handed
particles and right-handed antiparticles. (In the massless limit these correspond to
negative and positive helicity eigenstates respectively.) Therefore the theory not
only violates parity P , it also violates charge conjugation C , the interchange of par-
ticles with their antiparticles. However, the fragment of the theory described in
the appendix is invariant under the combined transformation CP . Just as only left-
handed electrons and quarks couple to the W s, only right-handed positrons and
anti-quarks couple to them.25 So a description of the left-handed β-decay of a
cobalt atom in intrinsic, relational terms will be equally true of a right-handed
decay of an antimatter cobalt nucleus.
Does this fact, by itself, vindicate a relational account of handedness? Simon
Saunders has suggested that it does (Saunders, 2000). His point is that the parity-
violating law does not, after all, ‘pick out’ a particular handedness. Anything that
is possible for a particle of one handedness is possible for particles of the opposite
handedness, although it may only be possible for oppositely handed particles if they
are also antiparticles of the first.
Just as the relationalist seeks to identify putatively distinct possible worlds con-
taining nothing but single hands that supposedly differ solely in the sense of their
handedness, Saunders urges that we should treat models of a parity-violating but
CP-symmetric theory that are related by a global CP-transformation as different
representations of the same state of affairs. If we describe a world in which the
the first created process is a decay of a cobalt atom, there is no fact of the matter
whether it was a decay of a matter nucleus emitting a right-handed antineutrino,
or the decay of an antimatter nucleus emitting a left-handed neutrino. (Of course,
if per impossibile the first created process of the actual world was a cobalt decay there
would be a fact of the matter. But this would be a relational fact: did the decay in-
volve the emission of a neutrino of the same handedness as particles that we in fact
call “right-handed” and a particle of the same charge as particles that we in fact
call “electrons”; or did it involve the emission of a neutrino of the same handed-
ness as particles that we in fact call “left-handed” and a particle of the same charge
as particles that we in fact call “positrons”?)
Unfortunately, CP (or even CPT ) symmetry does not by itself save the relation-
25The full Standard Model, involving all three generations of quarks, violates PC symmetry.
However, any theory based on a Lorentz-invariant Lagrangian L(x) formed from products of
quantum fields at the point x will be invariant under the combined transformation CPT .
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alist. Nor, indeed, is it even a necessary component of the relationalist’s account.
To see this, consider the following toy models. The first involves a possible world
whose fundamental objects are hand-shaped and come in two varieties: “red” and
“green”. Red hands are never created, but they can “decay” into green hands.
Now let us suppose that only red ‘left’ hands can decay into green ‘left’ hands.
Red ‘right’ hands never decay and no green ‘right’ hands exist at all. This decay
law clearly violates parity.
We can, however, extend our example so that it involves a P-violating but ‘CP ’
symmetric law. In this second possible world, we now imagine that the red hands
are ‘charged’ in that they attract or repel one another: similarly charged hands
repel each other whereas oppositely charged hands attract each other. Now both
left and right red hands can be ‘negatively’ and ‘positively’ charged. However,
suppose that it is the case that only ‘negatively’ charged red left hands can decay
into green (left) hands whereas ‘positively’ charged right hands can decay into
green right hands. The law is now CP symmetric: if a particular hand can decay,
then so can its incongruent, charge-reversed counterpart.
Is this CP-symmetric law really more susceptible of a relationalist interpreta-
tion than the first, P-violating law? The problem that the relationalist still faces
is to explain why negatively charged red right hands cannot decay into similarly
oriented green hands when negatively charged red left hands (i.e., hands that are
identical apart from the sense of their handedness) can. Relationalism denies that
there is some intrinsic difference between the two types of hand that can ground
and explain their different interactions. The fact that positively charged red right
hands can decay into similarly oriented green hands does nothing to ameliorate
the problem. Similarly, the relationalist is at a loss to explain why only left-handed
electrons couple to W bosons. How can it be that left-handed and right-handed
electrons interact differently if the relationalist is correct in his deflationary account
of what their being left- or right-handed consists in? The fact that right-handed
positrons can couple to W bosons is of little comfort.
There is another reason for being wary of invoking CP (or CPT ) symmetry to
save a relational account of handedness: it fails to secure for the relationalist all
that he desires. In his correspondence with Clarke, Leibniz, the arch-relationalist,
insisted that two putatively distinct possible worlds differing solely over where the
material universe was located in space were really just two ways of differently de-
scribing a single possibility. It is the homogeneity of space—that translations are a
symmetry of Newtonian mechanics—that means that if one of these worlds is phys-
ically possible, then so is the other. Similarly, the relationalist will wish to see two
models of a P-violating but CP-symmetric theory that are related by a global CP
transformation as but two ways of representing a single state of affairs.
What, though, should they say about the model one obtains from one model
from such a pair by performing a global parity transformation without also inter-
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changing matter with antimatter? In the case of our second toy model, we obtain
a world where it is negatively charged right hands and positively charged left hands
that can decay. In the case of the a model of the Standard Model, we describe a
world where right-handed electrons and left-handed positrons couple to W bosons. The
relationalist who sees the existence of a symmetry as a prerequisite of being able
to identify the possibilities represented by models related by a non-trivial, global
transformation must deny that these situations are equivalent to the original ones.
He must even deny that they obey the same laws!
Something surely has gone wrong here. In what way does the parity-imaged
model differ from the original? We call the quarks that couple to theW s in the first
model “left-handed”, and call the quarks which couple to the W s in the second
model “right-handed”, but what is the difference between them? In terms of the
functional roles they play within the models, they are indistinguishable. If the
original model was detailed enough to include human experimenters referring
to left-handed quarks, then their counterparts in the second model will call the
supposedly right-handed quarks “left-handed” too. The relationalist intuition is
surely that the left-handed quarks of the first model should be identified with the
so-called right-handed quarks of the second.
Despite the fact that the worlds described by the two models display a law-
like asymmetry between left and right, and despite the fact that the models are
nominally the mirror images of each other, they should be regarded as solutions of
a single theory, and the two models should be judged to describe a single possibility.
So let us now return to Earman’s claim that the relationalist lacks the “analyt-
ical resources” to describe a law that can embrace both models. The relationalist
must eschew terms such as “left” or “right”, and he must not rely on a formulation
that makes implicit use of such terms by relating the physics to, for example, right-
handed coordinate systems. It seems, however, that the relationalist can indeed
provide such a law.
Consider the first toy model again. The claim that all red hands which decay
into green ones are handed in the same way embraces both the original possible world
and its supposedly distinct parity-image. What is there to stop the relationalist
claiming that this is a lawlike statement and, moreover, that it is primitive: it cannot
be further explained in terms of more fundamental laws? Turning to the second,
CP-symmetric, toy model, we can state that red hands that repel each other and which
can decay into green hands are handed in the same way; red hands that attract
each other and which can decay into green hands are handed in the opposite way.
Saunders offers a similar schematic law for β-decay:
PC Charge-conjugate β-decay processes are oppositely oriented.
He stresses that this a PC invariant statement of P violation. What is important
for the present discussion is that it is also a P invariant statement, even though it
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is an expression of P violation. The statement is true both of a model where
“left-handed” electrons couple toW bosons and of a model where “right-handed”
electrons do so. Of course, the law needs to be extended to include all varieties of
fields—in particular, it must say something positive about the interactions which
the electron-positron pair that cannot be produced in β-decays can undergo—but
the outlines of how this is to be done are clear enough.
5 Orientation Fields
In characterizing the relationalist’s position in this way, I am very close to Carl
Hoefer. He writes: “The correct perspective, for either relationists or substanti-
valists, is this: P-violating laws mandate that there shall be a certain, qualitative, spatial
asymmetry in events. They do not explain the asymmetry or how it arises. . . Bringing
in enantiomorphic objects allows one to ‘anchor’ the asymmetry descriptively, but
is in no way explanatory of the asymmetry, nor do such objects become ‘referred
to’ in the laws by being so used” (Hoefer, 2000: 253). In the case of the Standard
Model, the enantiomorphic objects in question are actual left and right hands that
are linked to the law, as we have seen, via the conventions that define what we
mean by right-handed coordinate systems.
However, Hoefer also claims that parity violating laws are “purely phenomeno-
logical” and that this should, at least in part, ease any worries that we might
have over the fact that the law-like asymmetry in phenomena is not ultimately
explained. This seems to me to be contestable. The Standard Model is not a
“purely” phenomenological law. There is a world of difference between the early
descriptions of the weak interactions in terms of V − A currents and the Standard
Model together with the understanding that it provides us with of these truly phe-
nomenological laws. The asymmetry in the phenomena is explained, albeit only in
terms of a deeper asymmetry that is not. We postulate fundamentally handed par-
ticles (corresponding to massless spin-12 Dirac fields) and attribute different sets of
interactions to oppositely handed fields. Why oppositely handed fields of the same
particle type differ in this way is not explained. But there is no reason why the fact
that they do should be seen as a phenomenological, rather than as a fundamental,
fact.
Lack of a further explanation should not per se be seen as a problem for the
relationalist. However, there is one feature of the relationalist’s story that some
will object to, and it is a feature that can lead back to substantivalism.
Recall that Van Cleve alleged that the problem faced by the relationalist was
ineliminable reference to particulars rather than “action at a distance”. We have
seen that there is no ineliminable reference to particulars. However, the basic
form of our proposed law—that all objects or processes of a certain relationally
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specifiable type are handed in the same way—is, in a certain specific sense, highly non-
local. For the relationalist, being handed in the same way just is for two things to
stand in certain spatio-temporal, and quite possibly spacelike, relations.
It is time to consider the recent ‘reconstruction’ of Earman’s argument offered
by Nick Huggett (Huggett, 2000). One of Huggett’s central claims is that rather
specific geometrical structures are involved in a proper formulation of parity-
violating laws. He illustrates this claim with his own toy model quantum theory,
involving two particles in one dimension, coupled by the following asymmetric
potential:
V (x1, x2) = λ(x1 − x2) + µ(x1 − x2)2. (1)
In this theory the two directions in its 1-dimensional space are not on a par. On
measurement of their positions, the probability of finding particle 1 ‘to the left of ’
particle 2 (i.e., with a more negative position coordinate, relative to the coordinate
expression of the potential given above) is greater than finding them the other way
around.26
Huggett’s claim is that the theory is not well-defined until an ‘arrow of space’
has been given, enabling us to say whether x1 < x2 or x2 < x1 ‘in absolute terms,
not just relative to some arbitrary coordinates’ (Huggett, 2000: 233). He links this
claim to the fact that the coordinate-free expression of the potential will involve the
explicit introduction of an orientation field (in the case of the 1-dimensional theory,
this field is simply a normalized 1-form). Similarly, if we were to express the equa-
tions of the Standard Model in a coordinate-free way, we would need to introduce
an orientation field explicitly, and distinguish left- and right-handed components
of fields by their relations to it, rather than to a standard coordinate system.
Huggett then puts the argument for substantivalism as follows, deliberately
paraphrasing Earman’s version of why the postulation of inertial structure to ground
the distinction between absolute and relative motion licences the move to substan-
tivalism:
. . . the ‘absolutist’ asserts that “the scientific treatment of motion . . . requires
some absolute quantities . . . such as handedness. To make these quan-
tities meaningful requires the use of an orientation, and this structure
must be a property of or inhere in something distinct from bodies. The
only plausible candidate for the role of supporting the nonrelational structures is the
spacetime manifold.” (Huggett, 2000: 236; cf. Earman, 1989: 125)
26Note that one unfortunate aspect of Huggett’s example can be ignored. His theory violates
both parity symmetry and permutation symmetry. It is not that one is more likely to find a particle of
one type to the left of a particle of another type; rather one is more likely to find particle 1, that
particular particle, to the left of particle 2. The fact remains that it is solely the theory’s violation of
parity that requires the introduction of an orientation field when expressed in a coordinate-free
way. Similarly the coordinate-free expression of the Standard Model requires the introduction of
an orientation field, even though this theory does not violate permutation symmetry.
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The parallel drawn here is suggestive and worth pursuing. Pure inertial mo-
tion can be thought of as manifesting rather noteworthy non-local correlations.
Assuming the correctness of Newtonian mechanics, one can, from the relative
motions of just three force-free bodies, construct a spatio-temporal coordinate sys-
tem with respect to which all three of these bodies are moving uniformly and in
straight lines.27 This is already a highly non-trivial fact that one might feel calls for
explanation, given that, as force-free bodies, the three bodies are supposed to be
moving quite independently of each other. What is perhaps more striking is that
every other force-free body is also moving inertially with respect to the coordinate
system defined by the first three. The substantivalist offers a local explanation of
these non-local correlations. According to him, the laws of motion constrain the
motions of such bodies at each point of spacetime to be geodesics, as defined at
each point by the affine connection.
Similarly, by reifying the orientation field, we can offer a local explanation of
the non-local correlations between β-decays: that all neutrinos emitted in such
decays are handed in the same way. According to Huggett’s substantivalist, these
correlations follow from the fact that the laws postulate that, at each point of space-
time, only quarks standing in one of the two possible relations to the orientation
field at that point can couple to W bosons.
If the introduction of a real orientation field provides a genuine and local
explanation of the congruence of all β-decays at no cost we should surely admit
such a field into our ontology. The question is, of course, whether the explanation
is genuine, and whether there are costs. One might also wonder whether such
a field supports spacetime substantivalism: does such a field obviously represent
spacetime structure (as does the metric field of relativistic theories28) rather than just
another real, physical field in spacetime?
Hoefer has objected to the move on different grounds. He holds that it amounts
to nothing more than writing reference to particular bits of space into the laws:
It seems wrong for a law of nature to contain reference to a particular,
contingent physical object. But it seems (to me) at least as wrong for
a law of nature to contain reference to particular bits of space. . . That
this is what is going on may be masked by talk of “absolute structures”
or “a preferred n-form defined at all points”, or something of this na-
ture. But such terminology, while not literally incorrect, really only
disguises the dependence on primitive identity to make the distinc-
27An elegant demonstration of this fact was given by Tait (Tait, 1883). For a nice account of it,
see Barbour (1999: Chap. 6).
28This claim is, perhaps, controversial. Here I am siding with, e.g., Maudlin (1989: 318) and
Hoefer (1998: 459–60) against Rovelli (1997: 193–4). For further discussion, see Pooley (2002:
Chap. 4).
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tions between orientations for us. (Hoefer, 2000: 253)
The reader might be surprised at this assertion. Where, in the foregoing dis-
cussion of orientation fields, was reference made to particular bits of space? The
reification of an orientation fields does not entail a commitment to primitive iden-
tity. Care is needed, however, as is illustrated by the following quite from Huggett,
which follows his explicit introduction of an orientation field into his toy-model
theory:
At this point it is worth noting for clarity that there is also a conven-
tional aspect to such handed theories. For suppose the arrow of space
now runs in the opposite sense; if VA remains the potential, then it will
have the opposite handedness in space (compared to the original, or
compared to some external bodies) and the system will behave differ-
ently. But if the potential also changes, VA → −VA, then of course the
dynamics will be as before. Thus, it does not make sense in this situa-
tion to ask in which direction the arrow of space runs, independently
of a given Hamiltonian, and likewise it makes no sense to ask which
sign of VA is correct, independently of an arbitrary choice of arrow.
Thus the two possible arrows and two possible Hamiltonians only al-
low two distinct theories not four. This point acknowledged, we can
talk of the arrow and the Hamiltonian and bear in mind the freedom
this actually leaves. (Huggett, 2000: 234–5)
I agree with Huggett that there are certainly no more than two possible theo-
ries, not four. However, two readings of this passage are possible. And read in one
way, precisely the wrong identifications are being advocated.
The orientation field is either supposed to be a real, physical field, or is sup-
posed to represent some genuinely asymmetric structure of space or spacetime
itself. If this is the case, then one cannot identify a theory that assigns a certain
probability to the vector from particle 1 to particle 2 being aligned with the arrow
defined by the orientation field, with a theory that assigns precisely that probability
to the case where the two vectors are in the opposite alignment. Similarly, a theory
that asserts that all electrons which are “congruent” to an orientation field couple
toW bosons and those which are “incongruent” do not, cannot be identified with
a theory that predicts the same phenomena by asserting that all electrons which
are incongruent to an orientation field couple to W bosons.
However, the anti-haecceitist substantivalist who follows Hoefer in denying
primitive identity relations between the spacetime points of different possible worlds
will not be able to distinguish worlds that involve the same relations between ori-
entation field and the matter fields, but that differ solely in terms of the relations
that all of these fields bear to particular points of spacetime. But this is exactly
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the distinction that Huggett might appear to be upholding when he talks, for ex-
ample, of the “arrow of space running in the opposite sense.” It seems that we
are here being asked explicitly to imagine the orientation field bearing a different
relationship to particular points of space.29
So we can introduce an orientation field to ground a local explanation of the
non-local asymmetries that the relationalist must postulate as brute, lawlike facts,
in a way that doed not involve an implicit commitment to haecceitism and primi-
tive identities. Nevertheless, it does appear to involve an unavoidable commitment
to the reality of differences that are unobservable in principle: the theory that has
only electrons “congruent” to such a field coupling to W bosons and the theory
that has only electrons “incongruent” to such a field coupling toW bosons must be
regarded as distinct theories, even though they are observationally indistinguish-
able. This problem is not merely the result of viewing the orientation field as a
physical field that is distinct from spacetime. If one were to insist that it is space-
time itself that has an intrinsically asymmetric structure, and that the orientation
field is just a mathematical device to encode such structure, one still would not
be able to collapse the four formally distinct theories down to one. As Huggett
notes (on the intended reading of the above quote), one is free to chose either of
the the two possible orientation fields as encoding such structure. But this does not
tell against there being a genuine metaphysical distinction between worlds where
electrons bearing one type of relation to this structure interact in a certain way and
worlds in which electrons bearing the opposite relation interact in an identical way.
The only way to avoid postulating such a distinction is to adopt the relationalist’s
account of parity violation, together with its brute, lawlike, non-localities.
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A The weak interaction
I should start by stressing that there are many reasons for thinking that the Stan-
dard Model is far from a final theory, not the least of which is the large number
of unexplained parameters involved that must be fixed by hand for the theory to
tally with experiment. There is also, as yet, no consensus on the correct way to
extend the Standard Model so as to include neutrino mass. Indeed, this caveat
is of relevance to our topic because some suggestions involve theories which are
fundamentally parity symmetric. The standard electro-weak theory results from
parity symmetry being spontaneously broken in such theories.
I propose to set these issues to one side. Treating the Weinberg-Salam the-
ory as a fundamental theory poses the most severe challenge for any account of
handedness according to which handedness is an extrinsic, rather than an intrin-
sic, matter. So if such an account can be defended in this context, a fortiori it should
be defensible in others.
Central to the Standard Model are the left-handed and right-handed compo-
nents of the various Dirac fields.30 Mathematically they are described in terms of





1− γ5)ψ, ψR = 12 (1+ γ5)ψ, (2)
where γ5 = γ0γ1γ2γ3. The γ-matrices might appear to be defined indepen-
dently of our coordinate conventions: all that is required is that they obey the
anti-commutation relations:
{γµ, γν} = 2gµνI , (3)
and gµν is left–right symmetric. However, they are tied to the coordinate system
through the Dirac equation:
(iγµ∂µ − m)ψ(x) = 0 . (4)
If we reverse the sense of our coordinate system, say by relabelling the x- and y-
axes, we switch the roles of γ1 and γ2. Since, from eqn 3, these anti-commute,
γ5 7→ −γ5 and so the mathematical description of the left-handed component of a fermionic
field with respect to a right-handed set of axes, is exactly the same description one gives to the
30In the following, I have drawn upon Peskin and Schroeder (1995) and unpublished lecture
notes by I.T. Drummond and H. Osborn.
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right-handed component with respect to a left-handed set of axes. The standard mathemat-
ical descriptions of the chiral components of a fermionic field thus clearly relate
them, more or less explicitly, to the the handedness of the Lorentz chart with
respect to which the physics is formulated. There is nothing in the standard math-
ematical description of a left-handed field that is not equally suited, given different
conventions, to describing a right-handed field.31
Having introduced the left-handed and right-handed components of the Dirac
field, we can see how parity violation is implemented in the Weinberg-Salam the-
ory. The theory is based on a Lagrangian density involving the Dirac lepton fields,
the gauge fields and a scalar field, the Higgs field. The Lagrangian is invariant
under certain local SU (2)×U (1) gauge transformations. The standard prescrip-
tion followed in constructing a gauge field theory is to start with a Lagrangian
that is invariant under some set of global gauge transformation and then create a
locally gauge invariant theory by replacing the derivative operators in the original
Lagrangian with “covariant derivatives” involving compensating gauge fields to
ensure the required invariance. In this case, the original Lagrangian is the stan-
dard (parity-symmetric) Dirac Lagrangian for massless fields (for simplicity I only
consider interactions involving electrons, positrons and their associated neutrinos):
Lkin(x) = ψeiγ.∂ψe + ψν iγ.∂ψν . (5)
No mass terms have been included because to construct a parity-violating gauge
theory, symmetries under which the left and right chiral components transform
differently must be gauged. This prohibits mass terms which mix left and right
components and are thus not invariant under such transformations.
We now rewrite the Lagrangian as:
L(x) = L¯(x)iγ.∂L(x) + R¯(x)iγ.∂R(x) . (6)
where L is a doublet involving the left-handed components of the neutrino and







R is a singlet involving the right-handed component of the electron field: R(x) =
eR(x).32
31I am indebted to David Wallace for this way of seeing how the handedness of field components
is defined in terms of the handedness of the coordinate chart.
32Although I have not included the right-handed component of the neutrino field, the fact that
neutrinos have mass means that the Standard Model must be extended to include it. The simplest
way of doing so would be to include the field as a separate singlet term. However, as mentioned
above, there are many rival proposals which experiment has yet to decide between.
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L is invariant under the SU (2) transformations:
L(x)→ e 12 iα.τL(x), L¯(x)→ e− 12 iα.τ L¯(x), R(x)→ R(x) , (8)
where τ are the 2× 2 Pauli matrices. It is also invariant under independent U (1)
phase transformations of L and R separately. In particular, it is invariant under the
separate phase transformations L → e−i 12χL and R → e−iχR which may be writ-
ten ψ → eiχYψ where Y = −12 for L and Y = −1 for R. These transformations
are taken as the U (1) transformations in an SU (2)×U (1) global symmetry group
in order that the resulting gauge theory is invariant under local gauge transforma-
tions generated by the electric charge and electromagnetism is recovered.
A local SU (2)× U (1) transformation is then written:
ψ → eiα(x).T+iχ(x)Yψ(x) (9)
where T = 12τ acting on L and T = 0 acting on R. A gauge invariant Lagrangian
is obtained by replacing the derivatives in eqn 6 with the covariant derivatives
Dµ = ∂µ − igAµ(x).T− ig′Bµ(x)Y . (10)
The result is:




L¯γµL + R¯γµR)Bµ . (11)
The consequences of gauging a symmetry group under which left and right
field components transform differently are nowmanifest. Since R is a singlet under
the chosen SU (2) transformations, it does not couple to the three component fields
of Aµ at all. That the left and right fields are assigned different values of “weak
hypercharge” Y means that the strengths of their coupling to the U (1) gauge field
Bµ is different.
The quantum field theory derived from this Lagrangian together with the ap-
propriate Lagrangian for the free gauge fields is not yet empirically adequate be-
cause the four gauge fields all correspond to massless gauge bosons. It was known
experimentally that there is only one massless gauge boson involved in electromag-
netic and weak interactions, the photon. The solution is to exploit the mechanism
of “spontaneous symmetry breaking”. A scalar field with a gauge invariant poten-
tial term that has a minimum for non-zero values of the field is postulated. As a
result of their coupling to this so-called Higgs field, all but one of the gauge fields
acquire a mass and, with the right transformation properties under the gauge
transformations assigned to the Higgs field, the massless field corresponds to the
U (1) gauge group of electromagnetism. The details need not concern us. All we
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need is that the ‘physical’ gauge fields corresponding to gauge bosons of definite




(A1µ − iA2µ) ,
Zµ = cos θWA3µ − sin θWBµ ,
Aµ = sin θWA3µ − cos θWBµ ,
(12)
where the Weinberg angle θW is defined by tan θW = g′/g. Making the identifi-
cation e = g sin θW , eqn 11 can be rewritten as:









Jµn Zµ , (13)
where the weak, electromagnetic and weak neutral currents are defined as follows:








cos2 θW τ3 + sin
2 θW 1
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Here again we see that only the left-handed fields couple to theW bosons and that
the coupling strengths of the left- and right-handed fields to the Z are different.
Only the left- and right-handed couplings of the electron/positron field to the
photon A is symmetric between left and right.
Let us now return to our original example of a parity-violating decay: the
β-decay of cobalt atoms, Co60 →Ni60 + e− + ν¯e. To model this in the electro-
weak theory outlined above, quarks need to be included. In addition to the dou-
blet under local SU (2) transformations, comprising the left-handed electron and
electron-neutrino fields, there are weak isospin doublets containing the muon and
muon-neutrino, the tau and tau-neutrino and three left-handed quark doublets.
The first of these comprises the up quark field uL(x) and a linear combination of
the down and strange quark fields dθL(x) = [cos θcdL(x) + sin θcsL(x)]. θc is the so-
called Cabibbo angle and its significance is not important for our discussion. The
β-decay in question involves the decay of a neutron within the Cobalt nucleus into
a proton with the emission of an electron and its antineutrino. This in turn is to
be understood as the decay of a down quark bound within the neutron into an up
quark (n ∼ udd → p ∼ uud). The interaction term responsible for this decay is
Jµ†W †µ where Jµ† contains the term 2eLγανeL = e¯γα(1− γ5)νe as before and also
2 cos θcdLγαuL = cos θcd¯γα(1 − γ5)u. The down quark decays into an up quark
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emitting a W− boson which decays into an electron and its antineutrino. But
since only left-handed quarks can couple to theW boson, only left-handed quarks
are involved in such decays and only left-handed electrons and positive helicity,
right-handed antineutrinos are observed as a result.
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